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1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees that “in all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to…be confronted with the witnesses 
against him.”1  This portion of the Sixth Amendment is referred to as the Confrontation Clause.  
The Confrontation Clause has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States to bar 
certain evidence in criminal trials.   
This paper will address the genesis of the Confrontation Clause in Western society, 
briefly track its development in England and the Colonies, outline the Supreme Court’s pre-20th 
Century interpretation, and then analyze four recent Supreme Court cases that have 
fundamentally altered the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence: Crawford v. 
Washington,2 Davis v. Washington,3 Giles v. California,4 and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.5  
After outlining the history of the Confrontation Clause and current state of the law, the paper will 
argue that the Court’s new interpretation of the Confrontation Clause is wrong because it 
contradicts the original intent of the Framers and too lightly disregards over 200 years of 
Supreme Court precedent.  Finally, this paper will describe how this interpretation will affect the 
prosecution of criminal defendants before concluding with several potential solutions to the 
problems created by Crawford and its progeny. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT ONE’S ACCUSERS 
The right to confront one’s accusers dates back to at least ancient Roman times.  In 
approximately A.D. 50, a Roman Governor named Porcius Festus explained to King Agrippa 
that “it was not the custom of the Romans to give up anyone before the accused met the accusers 
                                                 
1 U.S. Const. amend VI.  
2 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
3 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
4 Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008). 
5 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
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face-to-face and had opportunity to make his defense concerning the charge against him.”6  
Furthermore, Emperor Justinian codified the right to confront one’s accusers in Roman law in 
A.D. 534.7  The Roman code eventually required that the prosecution’s witnesses had to testify 
in court and before the accused.8  
The execution of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1618 had profound influence on the development 
of the right to confront one’s accusers.  Raleigh was charged with High Treason.9  The only 
evidence presented against him was a sworn confession by Raleigh’s alleged co-conspirator, 
Lord Cobham. 10   When the prosecution attempted to read Cobham’s affidavit, Raleigh 
unsuccessfully demanded that Cobham be produced.11  While Raleigh was allowed to introduce a 
letter supposedly written by Cobham that denied any conspiracy, the prosecution countered the 
letter with a rebuttal letter and a rebuttal witness.12  Based on this evidence, Raleigh was 
convicted and executed.13  The execution caused great unrest in England and eventually led to 
reform of the English law.14  While the execution of Raleigh caused a great stir in England, 
scholars debate its influence on the American Colonies.15   
The American Colonies seem to have developed the right to confront somewhat 
independently of England.  In the 17th Century, there is little mention of the right in the Colonists’ 
charters and declarations.16  However, in the mid-18th Century, Sir William Blackstone published 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, a four volume work that was read and accepted by many 
                                                 
6 Acts 25:16, The Holy Bible. 
7 Penny J. White, Rescuing the Confrontation Clause, 54 S.C. L. Rev. 537, 544 (2003). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 542. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 543. 
15 Murl A. Larkin, The Right of Confrontation: What Next?, 1 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 67,  69-70 (1969). 
16 Id. at 70. 
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of the Colonists.17  Blackstone hailed the merit of having witnesses appear in court before the 
parties, judge, and jury, and he criticized the English practice of taking depositions in private and 
then reading them before the court.18  The publication of Blackstone’s work came at a time when 
the Colonists were generally becoming more and more dissatisfied with their legal treatment 
from England, and not at a time when the colonies were looking favorably on the English 
government and legal system.     
A few years after Blackstone published Commentaries on the Laws of England, 
Parliament passed the Stamp Act, which the Colonists reacted to with violence.19  Parliament 
opted to take a stern approach toward the Colonists and thus passed resolutions which would 
allow accused Colonists to be tried in England.20  Such trials would deprive those Colonists of a 
trial by a jury composed of their neighbors and would require a trial by deposition.21  These 
resolutions were met with predictable disdain by the Colonists and contributed to the push for 
independence.22  Shortly thereafter, seven of the Colonies that adopted their own Constitutions 
incorporated the right to meet one’s accusers face-to-face.23  Once independence was won and 
the Constitution was published for ratification, the strongest objection raised by the Anti-
Federalists was that it omitted a bill of rights.  These objections to the proposed Constitution 
demonstrate the concern many Colonists had about criminal procedure protections.  Thus, it was 
England’s deficient legal protection and the Colonists’ fear of lapsing back into a similar 
situation that led to the enumeration of the right to confront one’s accusers in the Bill of Rights.  
                                                 
17 Id. at 72. 
18 Id. at 73, (quoting Sir William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries on the Laws of England, 373-74 (1968)). 
19 Larkin, supra, at 72. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 75-76. 
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II.  ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION 
The Framers’ understanding of what the Sixth Amendment was supposed to guard 
against is necessarily linked to the social and legal context of the late 18th Century.  The 
Colonists’ development of the rule was more of a response to inadequate legal protections by the 
English Parliament than a right modeled after English practice.  As Murl L. Larkin noted:  
the immediate and perhaps paramount impetus for the inclusion of the right of 
confrontation in the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776 was the legislatively 
expressed intentions of the British to try colonists in England for crimes allegedly 
committed in the colonies, which would inevitably have involved the use of 
depositions or ex parte affidavits by the prosecution.  The use of a deposition does 
not, of course, necessarily deny to the accused the right to face the witness and to 
test his testimony by cross-examination.  Instead, the vice of a deposition is that it 
does not compel the witness to ‘stand face to face with the jury in order that they 
may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in 
which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.’ 24     
 
The Framers wanted to avoid a trial by affidavit or deposition.25  The right to confrontation was 
more about meeting one’s accusers in open court than the right to cross examination.26  
Unfortunately, unlike other provisions in the Bill of Rights, the Framers did not extensively 
debate the Confrontation Clause and thus did not provide a record of what they expected in terms 
of the scope of the right.27  
III.  EARLY SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATIONS 
Reynolds v. United States,28 was the first case with a Confrontation Clause issue to reach 
the Supreme Court.  In Reynolds, the defendant was charged with bigamy.29  His second wife 
testified at the first trial and the defendant had the ability to cross-examine her.30  On appeal after 
                                                 
24 Larkin, supra, at 76-77 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895)).  James Madison 
modeled the wording of the Sixth Amendment after the Virginia Constitution.  White, supra, at 552. 
25 Larkin, supra, at 76; Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243.    
26 Larkin, supra, at 78. 
27 White, supra, at 552. 
28 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
29 Id. at 146. 
30 Id. at 159. 
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conviction, the indictment for the first trial was found invalid and a new trial ordered.31  When 
the sheriff went to deliver the subpoena to the second wife for the second trial, the defendant said 
the second wife was not present, had not been for a while, and would not be available for the 
second trial.32  After several return trips by the sheriff, the trial court allowed the trial to continue 
by having the second wife’s testimony from the first trial read into evidence.33  The defendant 
claimed this violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.34  The 
Court held that the admission of such evidence was not erroneous because “[t]he Constitution 
does not guarantee an accused person against the legitimate consequences of his own wrongful 
acts.”35  The Court found that since the defendant had the opportunity to account for his wife’s 
absence or deny under oath that he had kept her away but failed to do so, it was proper to admit 
the evidence.36 
 In Mattox v. United States, the Court provided significant insight into the nature of the 
Sixth Amendment right to confront one’s accusers. 37  In that case, the defendant was tried and 
convicted of murder.38  On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.39 
Before the second trial, two of the prosecution’s witnesses died.40  The district court judge 
allowed the testimony of the deceased witnesses to be read at the second trial and the defendant 
was convicted.41  The Supreme Court held “a copy of the stenographic report of the [deceased 
witness’s] entire former testimony, supported by the oath of the stenographer that it is a correct 
                                                 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 159-60. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 158. 
36 Id. at 160-61. 
37 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895). 
38 Id. at 239. 
39 Id. at 237. 
40 Id. at 240. 
41 Id. 
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transcript…is competent evidence.”42  The Court stated that “[a]s to the practice of this country, 
we know of none of the states in which such testimony is now to be held inadmissible.”43  “The 
primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depositions or ex parte 
affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu 
of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness….”44  After it recognized the 
importance of the right, the Court said that “rules of this kind, however beneficent in their 
operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to consideration of public 
policy and the necessities of the case.”45  “The law, in its wisdom, declares that the rights of the 
public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the 
accused.” 46 
 In Kirby v. United States, the Court affirmed that the rules of evidence should be 
considered in Confrontation issues, but unlike in Mattox it emphasized the supremacy of 
Constitutional principles.47  In that case, the defendant was charged with receiving stolen 
property.48  The prosecution sought to prove the “stolen” element through a court record that 
demonstrated the men who gave the defendant the property in question had been convicted of 
larceny.49  The Court held that the defendant’s right to confrontation was violated when the trial 
court admitted the record because:  
a fact which can be primarily established only by witnesses cannot be proved 
against an accused…except by witnesses who confront him at the trial, upon 
whom he can look while being tried, whom he is entitled to cross-examine, and 
                                                 
42 Id. at 244. 
43 Id. at 241. 
44 Id. at 243. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899). 
48 Id. at 49. 
49 Id. 
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whose testimony he may impeach in every mode authorized by the established 
rules governing the trial.50   
 
The Court noted that dying declarations were a common law exception to this rule because those 
declarations were the equivalent of testimony under oath.51  The Court did not explain what type 
of facts can primarily be established solely by witnesses.  
Five years later, the Court addressed the issue of whether the reading of a deposition in a 
State criminal trial was a violation of the defendant’s right to due process of law under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.52  In West, the Court declined to incorporate the Sixth Amendment to 
the States and then went on to hold that no federal right was violated by reading the transcript 
from a preliminary hearing of a witness who was not available at the trial.53  The Court 
emphasized that “[a]t common law, the right existed to read a deposition upon the trial of the 
defendant, if such deposition had been taken when the defendant was present and when the 
defendant’s counsel had had an opportunity to cross-examine” and if the witness was now dead, 
insane, too ill, kept away by the defendant, or generally unavailable.54  Toward the end of its 
opinion, the Court cited several cases in support of its holding and noted that all of these cases 
recognized some exceptions to the general rule.55   
IV.  INCORPORATION TO CRAWFORD: IN SEARCH OF A STANDARD 
After deciding several cases with Confrontation Clause issues in less than 30 years, the 
Court did not decide another one for 60 years.  Part of the reason for the extended silence in the 
first half of the 20th Century was due to the fact that the Court did not incorporate the Sixth 
                                                 
50 Id. at 55. 
51 Id. at 61. 
52 West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 262 (1904) (overruled by Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)). 
53 Id. at 262-63. 
54 Id. at 262. 
55Id. at 265-68 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 
(1895), Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899), and Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900)).  
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Amendment until the 1965 term.  Incorporation of the Sixth Amendment eventually led to 
fundamental changes in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Confrontation Clause.  
In Douglas v. Alabama, the Court emphasized the importance of cross-examination in 
Confrontation Clause analysis. 56  In that case, the defendant was charged with assault with intent 
to murder.57  The man he allegedly conspired with, Loyd, was tried first and convicted.58  At the 
defendant’s trial, the prosecutor called Loyd and attempted to question him about a confession 
Loyd had made.59  When Loyd invoked the privilege against self-incrimination, the prosecutor 
went through Loyd’s confession line by line and asked if Loyd had made the statement.60  After 
each question, Loyd invoked the privilege.61  While the confession was never admitted, it was 
the only direct “evidence” linking the defendant to the crime.62  The defendant was convicted but 
the Court held that the defendant’s “inability to cross-examine Loyd as to the alleged confession 
plainly denied him the right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause.”63  The 
Court cited and qualified Mattox by noting that “an adequate opportunity for cross-examination 
may satisfy the clause even in the absence of physical confrontation.”64 
The Supreme Court applied the Sixth Amendment to the States via the Fourteenth 
Amendment in Pointer v. Texas.65  After expounding on how the right to confrontation and 
cross-examination is essential to the due process of law, the Court recognized two exceptions to 
the right of confrontation: dying declarations and testimony given at a former trial.66  The Court 
                                                 
56 Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). 
57 Id. at 416. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 416-17. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 419. 
63 Id. at 419.  
64 Id. at 418. 
65 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965). 
66 Id. at 407. 
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held that the defendant’s right to confrontation was violated when the trial court admitted a 
witness’s preliminary examination testimony because the defendant was not represented by 
counsel at that examination.67  
In California v. Green, the Court attempted to remove some of the confusion regarding 
the Confrontation Clause’s connection to the rules of evidence.68  The Court stated that 
“[w]hether admission of the statement would have violated federal evidentiary rules against 
hearsay...is a wholly separate question.”69  The Court clarified that the Confrontation Clause may 
be violated even though the evidence is admissible under the rules of evidence and that merely 
because evidence violates the hearsay rules does not mean it violates the Confrontation Clause.70 
The Court held where a defendant represented by counsel had opportunity to cross-examine a 
witness at a preliminary hearing, the witness's preliminary hearing statements were admissible at 
trial if the witness was absent.71 
Justice Harlan concurred in the Green decision.72  He agreed that the hearsay rules are not 
in complete congruence with the right to confrontation.73  He wrote separately to warn against 
equating confrontation with cross-examination and to argue that the confrontation right should be 
understood to mean that “a State may not in a criminal case use hearsay when the declarant is 
available.”74  Justice Harlan’s first point is technically accurate.  However, as Justice Brennan 
noted in dissent, “[a] face to face encounter…is important, not so that the accused can view at 
trial his accuser’s visage, but so that he can directly challenge the accuser’s testimony before the 
                                                 
67 Id. at 407-08. 
68 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 164 (1970). 
69 Id. at 164 n.15 (citation omitted). 
70 Id. at 155-56. 
71 Id. at 170. 
72 Id. at 172 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
73 Id. at 473. 
74 Id. at 174, 187. 
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factfinder.”75  Indeed, Justice Harlan’s warning is not followed by any express statement of what 
else the right could include beyond cross-examination.  The second part of Justice Harlan’s 
opinion may have established a basis for the Court to alter its interpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause in Crawford v. Washington.76 
Justice Brennan dissented in Green and attempted to show the inadequacy of using a 
preliminary examination transcript at trial when the witness becomes unavailable. 77   He 
articulately demonstrated how the strategy used by defense attorneys at preliminary 
examinations did not allow for the confrontation right to be satisfied at trial and how merely 
reading former testimony does not give the jury the chance to evaluate the witness’s demeanor.78 
In Ohio v. Roberts, the Supreme Court synthesized recent precedent with important 
aspects of Mattox to put forth a two-part test: to admit hearsay against a criminal defendant under 
Roberts, the prosecution had to show necessity and that the hearsay had adequate indicia of 
reliability.79  The first step in the Court’s analysis was to state what the text could not mean: an 
unequivocal right to confrontation at trial.80  The Court reasoned that the Confrontation Clause 
could not be read absolutely literally because that would require “the exclusion of any statement 
made by a declarant not present at trial.”81  Such an interpretation “would abrogate virtually 
every hearsay exception, a result long rejected as unintended and too extreme.”82  The Court 
grounded this analysis on the statement in Mattox that dying declarations were an exception to 
the Confrontation Clause.83  Furthermore, the Court noted that as early as Mattox, the Court had 
                                                 
75 Id. at 192 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
76 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
77 Id. at 189-90 (Brennan J., dissenting). 
78 Id. at 195. 
79 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) (overruled by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)). 
80 Id. at 62-63. 
81 Id. at 63. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
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recognized that the right would yield when public policy or the necessities of a particular case so 
demanded.84  The idea that “competing interests…may warrant dispensing with confrontation at 
trial” was also supported by the Court in Chambers v. Mississippi. 85  After recognizing that a 
literal interpretation was not what the Framers intended, or at least not how the Court had 
interpreted the Clause since its earliest decisions, the Court moved to what it believed the 
Framers did intend: a mere “preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial.”86  At this point the 
Court articulated what it believed the Confrontation Clause is truly about in a single word: 
reliability.87  To justify reliability as the standard, the Court once again turned to the section of 
Mattox that recognized confrontation gave the accused the opportunity to test the recollection 
and conscience of the witness while giving the jury the chance to evaluate his credibility.88  After 
listing the reasons for giving accused the right to confront their accusers, the Court summarized 
its interpretation of the Confrontation Clause by saying, “the Sixth Amendment demands: 
‘substantial compliance’ with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement.”89 
Once the Court established the purpose and limitations of the Sixth Amendment in 
Roberts, it developed the two-part rule.  The first step for the prosecution to prove was 
necessity.90  Typically, the prosecution had to demonstrate that the witness whose testimony it 
sought to use was unavailable; however, “a demonstration of unavailability, is not always 
                                                 
84 Id. at 64. 
85 Id. (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Mattox, 156 U.S. at 340).  
86 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 (citing Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)). 
87 Id. at 65. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 69 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 166 (1970)). 
90 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 78-79. 
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required.”91  Absent this exception, the prosecution had to make a good-faith effort to obtain the 
witness’s presence at trial.92 
After showing necessity, the prosecution had to prove that the statement “bears adequate 
‘indicia of reliability.’”93  The Court explained that “[r]eliability can be inferred without more in 
a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.  In other cases, the 
evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.”94  By defining reliability in this way, the Court moved away from its approach 
in Green, where it had attempted to put distance between the Confrontation Clause and the rules 
of evidence.95  The Court left for another day which hearsay exceptions were “firmly rooted.”96 
A few years after Roberts was decided, the Court reiterated that unavailability was not 
required to satisfy the first prong of the Roberts rule in United States v. Inadi.97  In reaching its 
conclusion, the Court conducted a benefits-burden analysis and found that “admission of 
coconspirators’ declarations…actually furthers the Confrontation Clause’s very mission which is 
to advance the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials.”98  Once again, the 
Court restated what it had said in Green concerning the Confrontation Clause’s connection to the 
rules of evidence: “[w]hile it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation 
Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, the overlap is not complete.”99 
                                                 
91 Id. at 64 n.7; See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95-96 (1970) (holding that the utility of trial confrontation 
may be so remote that the prosecution is not required to produce a seemingly unavailable witness). 
92 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74 
93 Id. at 66. 
94 Id. 
95 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 164 n.15. 
96 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
97 United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 391-92 (1986). 
98 Id. at 396 (quoting Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415 (1985) (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89, 
91 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
99 Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394 n.5 (quoting Green v. California, 399 U.S. at 155) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Bourjaily v. United States, gave the Court the opportunity to expound on the second 
Roberts prong.100  In an opinion joined by Justice Scalia, the Court held that independent indicia 
of reliability is not mandated by the Constitution when, as in Bourjaily, the statement falls within 
a firmly rooted hearsay exception.101  Since co-conspirator’s statements had been admissible for 
over 150 years and since the Court had repeatedly affirmed this exception as “accepted practice,” 
the Court found it was a firmly rooted hearsay exception and that courts no longer needed to 
conduct an evaluation as to whether such statements would satisfy the second Roberts prong.102 
Three Justices, one of which was the author of Roberts, disagreed that the co-conspirator 
exception should be considered a firmly rooted hearsay exception for a couple of reasons.103  
First, the three dissenters believed that the Court fundamentally altered the exception by 
removing the independent evidence requirement of the co-conspirator exception.104  Second, the 
co-conspirator exception is not based on its propensity for trustworthiness, something that is 
inherent to hearsay exceptions and the basic purpose of the Confrontation Clause.105 
The Court took a step toward a more literal interpretation in Coy v. Iowa.106  In that case, 
it held the defendant’s right to Confrontation was violated when the trial court allowed the child 
witnesses to testify behind a screen.107  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, reasoned “that 
there is something deep in human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation between accused 
and accuser as ‘essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution.’”108  The Court repeated what it 
had said in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, “‘[t]he Confrontation Clause provides two types of 
                                                 
100 Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). 
101 Id. at 183. 
102 Id. at 183-84. 
103 Id. at 186 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988). 
107 Id. at 1020. 
108 Id. at 1017 (quoting Pointer, 380. U.S. at 404). 
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protections for a criminal defendant: the right to physically face those who testify against him, 
and the right to conduct cross-examination.’”109   The Court admitted that the rights conferred by 
the Confrontation Clause are not absolute and may be overridden if public policy so demanded, 
but attempted to curb some of its recent decisions by segregating the rights conferred by the 
Confrontation Clause from “the right narrowly and explicitly set forth in the Clause.”110  The 
Court failed to explain how the right to cross-examine, the right to exclude out-of-court 
statements, and the right to face-to-face confrontation were somehow conferred and thus separate 
from “the right narrowly and explicitly set forth in the Clause.”111 
For some time, the Justices of the Supreme Court had been forming two distinct views of 
what the Confrontation Clause guaranteed.  The line between these two views was clearly drawn 
in Maryland v. Craig.112  Before this opinion, few if any Justices called for a strict literal reading 
of the text; it seemed widely accepted that the right must be checked by exceptions or a need to 
balance policy and practical considerations.  The Court seemed to take a step toward a more 
literal interpretation in Coy.113  However, whatever ground was gained for the literal view was 
lost and more in Craig.114  In Craig, the Court held that when:  
the State makes an adequate showing of necessity, the state interest in protecting 
child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case is sufficiently 
important to justify the use of a special procedure that permits the child 
witness…to testify at trial against a defendant in the absence of face-to-face 
confrontation with the defendant.115 
 
In reaching this conclusion the Court pointed out that it has never held that “the Confrontation 
Clause guarantees criminal defendants the absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with witnesses 
                                                 
109 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1017 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987)). 
110 Id. at 1020-21. 
111 Id.   
112 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). 
113 487 U.S. at 1017-1018. 
114 497 U.S. at 844-45. 
115 Id. at 855. 
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against them at trial.”116  It also repeated that a literal interpretation of the Confrontation Clause 
is inappropriate and that exceptions to the right are allowed only “when necessary to further 
public policy.”117  Finally, it made a bold, yet supported, statement about the nature of the right: 
“‘[i]t is all but universally assumed that there are circumstances that excuse compliance with the 
right of confrontation.’”118 
The holding of Craig, which neatly sidestepped around the factual similarities of Coy was 
met with vehement disapproval by the author of Coy, Justice Scalia, as well as Justices Brennan 
and Marshall.119  Justice Scalia responded to the majority opinion with a dissenting opinion that 
called for a strict literal reading of the Sixth Amendment.120 
The fragmentation of the Court was demonstrated by Lilly v. Virginia.121  In that case, a 
majority of Justices were only able to agree on the narrow factual holding that the confession of 
the defendant’s alleged co-conspirator was not admissible under the Confrontation Clause.122 
V.  THE TESTIMONIAL STANDARD 
The Court set upon a new path in the early part of the 21st Century.  The first step was 
taken in Crawford v. Washington.123  In Crawford, the Court abrogated Roberts because the 
reliability test was “amorphous” and “unpredictable.”124  Starting afresh, the Court turned to a 
word-by-word, plain meaning evaluation of the text:  
[The Confrontation Clause] applies to ‘witnesses’ against the accused-in other 
words, those who ‘bear testimony.’ 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the 
English Language (1828). ‘Testimony,’ in turn, is typically ‘[a] solemn 
                                                 
116 Id. at 844. 
117 Id. at 845, 848. 
118 Id. at 849-50 (quoting Michael H. Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter 
Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 Crim. L. Bull. 99, 107-08 (1972)). 
119 Id. at 860 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
120 Id. at 863. 
121 Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999). 
122 Id. at 139-40. 
123 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
124 Id. at 63. 
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declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some 
fact.’ Ibid. An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers 
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an 
acquaintance does not.125 
 
Based on this strict literal reading of the text, the Court went on to hold that “where testimonial 
hearsay is at issue, the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability 
and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”126  While the Court left the definition of 
“testimonial” for another day, it concluded that a core class of testimonial statements exist, some 
of which include “affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was 
unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to 
be used prosecutorially.”127 
 The Court defined “testimonial” in Davis v. Washington, and its companion case 
Hammon v. Indiana by way of example and non-example.128  In Davis, Michelle McCottry 
called 911 when she was attacked by her former boyfriend, Adrian Davis.129  When McCottry 
failed to appear at Davis’s trial, the Prosecution had the 911 tape admitted.130  The Court found 
that McCottry’s statements were not testimonial because McCottry was frantically speaking 
about events as they were actually happening to meet an on-going emergency so that the police 
could resolve the emergency.131  Conversely, police responded to a general domestic violence 
call in Hammon.132  Once at the Hammon home, one officer met with Amy Hammon in the 
living room while the other officer met with Amy’s husband Hershel in the kitchen.133  The 
Court found Amy’s statements to the officer were testimonial because they described past events, 
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were not said in the face of an on-going emergency, were not stated for the purpose of resolving 
some conflict, and were not made in a frantic environment.134  Summarizing its holding, the 
Court said:  
[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation 
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.  They 
are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such 
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.135 
 
In Giles v. California, the Court reiterated that the right to confrontation is a common law 
right and thus only exceptions to the right recognized at common law apply.136  In that case the 
defendant allegedly murdered a woman named Avie.137  The prosecution sought to admit 
statements made by Avie that suggested the defendant had abused her.138  The Court found that 
forfeiture by wrong-doing was a common law exception to the confrontation right but that the 
facts of this case did not qualify for that exception because the defendant’s alleged action of 
murdering the witness was not designed to keep her from testifying.139 
The Court applied Crawford and Davis to laboratory certificates in Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts.140  The Court quickly found that the certificates were similar to affidavits and 
were thus within the core class of testimonial statements prohibited by the Confrontation 
Clause.141  The certificates constituted a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose 
of proving a fact; specifically, the fact in question was the precise testimony that the analysts 
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would be expected to provide if called at trial.142  Accordingly, the analysts were witnesses for 
Sixth Amendment purposes and their certificates could not be admitted unless the analysts were 
unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the analysts.143 
VI.  PROBLEMS WITH THE NEW CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
First, Crawford misstates one of the earliest, and thus most important, Supreme Court 
decisions that addressed the Confrontation Clause: Mattox v. United States.144  The Court cited 
Mattox several times in Crawford but artfully omitted key sections of the opinion that undercut 
the rigid testimonial rule.145  After recognizing the importance of the right to Confrontation,  
Mattox qualified the right: 
rules of law of this kind, however beneficent in their operation and valuable to the 
accused, must occasionally give way to consideration of public policy and the 
necessities of the case….  The law, in its wisdom, declares that the rights of the 
public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be 
preserved to the accused.146 
 
To demonstrate, the Mattox Court noted that many of the provisions of the Bill of Rights are 
checked by long-standing exceptions that “were obviously intended to be respected.” 147  
Furthermore, “technical adherence to the letter of a constitutional provision may occasionally be 
carried further than is necessary to the just protection of the accused, and further than the safety 
of the public will warrant.”148  Rather than taking a strict literal approach, Mattox expressly 
criticized such an approach and established a framework for later courts to conduct a benefits-
burden analysis if the circumstances of the case warranted.149 
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Mattox was correct in holding that the right to confront was not meant to be absolute. 
Commentators and judges have reached similar conclusions.  “There is universal agreement that 
this provision was not intended by its drafters to be absolute and complete.”150  According to J. 
Chitty, “the statutes which authorize the justices to take [depositions] extend only to cases of 
manslaughter and felony; and therefore they are not admissible in case of a mere misdemeanour 
[sic], or for punishing a libel.”151  “The 6th Amendment was intended to prevent the trial of 
criminal cases upon affidavits, not to serve as a rigid and inflexible barrier against the orderly 
development of reasonable and necessary exceptions to the hearsay rule.”152 
The Mattox approach is not inconsistent with how the Framers viewed the right.  The fact 
that there is little commentary from the Framers about this rule does not mean they necessarily 
intended it to be applied in strict adherence.  The criminal procedure protections extended in the 
Bill of Rights were about necessity and fairness.  Many of the Framers were lawyers – men who 
were familiar with the trial process.  They were also rebels who risked much in chartering the 
early waters of America’s independence. They were thus particularly sensitive to protection from 
the federal government.  However, they were also men of reason and common sense and thus it 
was appropriate for Mattox to allow for a benefits-burden analysis in the Confrontation Clause 
context.   
Refusing to interpret a provision of the Constitution literally is not a novel concept for the 
Court.  The Eleventh Amendment is not read literally because the Court understood that the 
circumstances under which it was adopted compel a non-literal interpretation.153  Furthermore, 
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the Fourteenth Amendment is not read in a strict literal fashion.154  If the Fourteenth Amendment 
was interpreted literally, the Privileges and Immunities Clause would offer some additional 
protection for United States citizens.155 
Four years after Mattox left the door ajar for exceptions in appropriate circumstances, the 
Court emphasized that the door was not completely open and that the right needed to be fiercely 
guarded.156  The new interpretation is thus not completely wrong.  The Court’s fierce defense of 
the right is consistent with the strong “preference for face-to-face confrontation.”157  Crawford 
was wrong in the sense that it slammed the door shut on any necessity exception.  
As mentioned before, after Mattox and Kirby, the Court did not accept a Confrontation 
Clause case for several decades.  That changed when the Court accepted two Confrontation 
Clause cases for the 1965 term.158  In the first of those cases, Pointer, the Court incorporated the 
Sixth Amendment to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment.159  Once the Sixth Amendment 
was incorporated, a host of factual scenarios implicating confrontation issues became available, 
and the Court predictably began accepting more Confrontation Clause cases.  
In Roberts, the Court attempted to put the language of Mattox and the general 
understanding that the Clause was not absolute into a more workable framework for the trial 
courts.160  When it adopted the two-part rule, the Roberts Court recognized the uncertainty 
surrounding the Confrontation Clause:  
[c]onvinced that no rule will perfectly resolve all possible problems…we reject 
the invitation to overrule a near-century of jurisprudence.  Our reluctance to begin 
anew is heightened by the Court’s implicit prior rejection of principal alternative 
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proposals, see Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S., at 93-100…(concurring opinion), and 
California v. Green, 399 U.S., at 172-189…(concurring opinion).161 
 
The Roberts rule did not go beyond what Mattox and the original understanding of the 
Confrontation Clause allowed in theory.  However in practice, the Court quickly stretched the 
framework beyond the exception contemplated in Mattox.  For example, in Inadi the Court 
allowed the prosecution to admit the confession of the defendant’s co-conspirator when the co-
conspirator failed to appear at trial.162  The practical necessities language of Mattox did not seem 
warranted by the circumstances in Inadi for two reasons.  First, Mattox seemed to anticipate a 
situation where the facts and interests so pulled against rigid adherence to the right that 
principles of justice demanded exception.163  Prosecutorial inconvenience does not seem to fall in 
that category.  Second, the facts in Inadi were similar to Douglas, which found the Confrontation 
Clause prohibited the co-conspirator’s statement.164  While the confession in Inadi may have 
lacked the formality found in Douglas,165 the cases were similar enough to warrant denying the 
confession.  Furthermore, in Bourjaily, the Court categorically held that statements made during 
a conspiracy could be admitted without violating the Confrontation Clause.166  Such categorical 
exceptions as this also conflict with the implied case-by-case analysis suggested in Mattox.167  
The downfall of Roberts may be linked to its allowance for firmly rooted hearsay exceptions to 
trump the right to Confrontation. 168   Allowing firmly rooted hearsay exceptions to take 
precedence over a Constitutional guarantee likely led to confusion and too much leeway in 
applying the necessity exception anticipated in Mattox.  
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In Coy, the Court appropriately attempted to redirect the Court back to a more traditional 
reading of the Clause.169  The potential exception in necessary circumstances was becoming too 
common and the right too exposed.170  Furthermore, the Court was blurring the line between the 
rules of evidence and the right to confront.171  In two cases decided shortly after Coy, the Court 
exercised the balancing exception appropriately.172  The need in those cases was not merely 
prosecutorial convenience but rather an actual interest of justice that merited a non-literal 
application of the text.173 
With four cases in fifteen years invoking the judicial bypass, Roberts was stretched 
beyond what the Clause allowed.174  Accordingly, when the Court accepted a case that would 
have easily been decided before Roberts, the Court was so fragmented as to the rationale to be 
employed, little consensus was achieved.175 
The lack of restraint in Inadi and Bourjaily led to the rigid backlash of Crawford.  In an 
attempt to avoid the complete dissolution of the Confrontation Clause protection, the Court 
overreacted by foreclosing any possibility of a necessity exception.176  This rigid application of 
the Sixth Amendment may have been seen as a necessary act of self-control by the Court to some.  
However, the strict approach taken by the Court allows for no leeway in situations that may 
merit excuse of the rule, even though Mattox and the Framers intended as much.  The Court has 
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had opportunities to hedge its interpretation in subsequent cases, but it has continued with the 
absolute approach.177 
The non-majority opinions in Crawford, Davis, and Melendez-Diaz recognized many of 
the problems with the new approach.178  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurring opinion in 
Crawford pointed out that the Court has never made testimonial the standard and criticized the 
Court for departing from precedent.179  Justice Thomas has criticized the new interpretation as 
unworkable and also inconsistent with precedent.180  Justice Thomas believes the Confrontation 
Clause should apply only to statements that fall within the core classes of testimonial 
statements.181  Finally, in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Melendez-Diaz, four Justices 
pointed out many of the practical problems of the new interpretation.182  Unfortunately, none of 
these minority opinions failed to recognize a truly viable solution based on the original 
understanding of the right and the Court’s precedent.   
The Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants the right to require the 
prosecution to call its witnesses to the stand and testify in open court.  This right is not absolute.  
There are three situations where the Confrontation right must yield.  First, dying declarations are 
a long-standing exception to the confrontation right that has been recognized since the earliest 
Supreme Court cases addressing the issue.183  Second, the equitable doctrine of forfeiture by 
wrong-doing prevents a criminal defendant from benefiting from his own wrongful acts.184  
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Third, in rare cases, necessity and justice warrant exception to the general confrontation right.185   
Situations that may merit exception by necessity must be scrutinized through a balancing test that 
evaluates the benefits and burdens of applying the rule in light of America’s strong preference 
for face-to-face confrontation.186 
One of the important counter-arguments to the necessity exception is that such an 
exception is too amorphous, thus giving courts more discretion than they are due.  The fear is 
that such discretion is sometimes abused and puts the courts in a situation where they are making 
too many decisions based on policy.  The developments after Roberts certainly gave credence to 
arguments for a more rigid rule.   While the Court may be uncomfortable with how the courts 
could stretch the exception, it does not excuse deviating from precedent and the original 
understanding of the right.  Bright line rules may be favored by some Justices, but the Framers 
were likely more concerned with fairness and protection from the federal government than 
making easy-to-apply rules.  While consistency is essential in the court system, the Court must 
be willing to trust the system when the Constitution so demands.  The Court can guard the 
necessity exception by building precedent that hems the rule into appropriate circumstances.   
Another problem with the recent line of cases, specifically Crawford, relates not to the 
substance of the Court’s rationale, but rather to the Court’s failure to adequately explain how it 
was justified in departing from precedent.  Stare decisis is Latin for “to stand by things 
decided.”187   In Payne v. Tennessee, the Court emphasized the importance of this doctrine:  
“[s]tare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and 
consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes 
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to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”188  The Court stated that “adhering 
to precedent is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the 
applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right.”189   
 The following term, the Court expounded on the importance of precedent in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, by declaring that “[l]iberty finds no refuge 
in a jurisprudence of doubt.”190  The Court then pooled “a series of prudential and pragmatic 
considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the 
rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.”191  
These considerations include:  
whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical 
workability…whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a 
special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of 
repudiation…whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have 
left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine…or whether facts 
have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule 
of significant application or justification.192 
 
The Court has recognized that “stare decisis is not an inexorable command.” 193 
Nonetheless, the Court should have at least considered the doctrine of stare decisis in Crawford.  
The fact that the majority opinions in Crawford, Davis, and Melendez-Diaz never mention the 
doctrine undermines the validity, integrity, and consistency of the Court.  The Court’s failure to 
more fully discuss its departure from precedent seems especially reproachable given that the 
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author of the majority opinions in Crawford, Davis, and Melendez-Diaz criticized the Court for 
not giving more thought to the doctrine in his dissenting opinion in Lawrence v. Texas.194   
 The Court did address why it thought Roberts should be overruled in Crawford.195  It did 
so by tracing the history of the right and then carefully proceeding through the Court’s 
precedent.196  The Court framed past decisions in a way that allowed them to say “[a]lthough the 
results of our decisions have generally been faithful to the original meaning of the Confrontation 
Clause, the same cannot be said of our rationales.”197  While it is true many of the Court’s results 
would have come to the same conclusions under the Court’s new testimonial analysis, it was 
dishonest to assume that the new framework was what the Court was unsuccessfully trying to say 
all along.  The fact that most of the cases’ results would be the same under the new analysis does 
not mean those old decisions support the new one.  The Court painted the precedent landscape in 
a way that made Roberts stand out by focusing on the results and not the means.198  It also 
carefully avoided phraseology in early decisions like Mattox.  After showing how Roberts 
purportedly drifted outside the line of a purportedly steady flow of precedent in favor of 
Crawford, the Court criticized Roberts as amorphous and too narrow to protect “core testimonial 
statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude.”199 
While the Court adequately addressed how it believed Roberts was an incorrect 
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, it failed to demonstrate how reversing 22-year old 
precedent was warranted under the Payne factors.  The Court failed to discuss how “the rule has 
proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability.”200  The Court also gave no 
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consideration to “whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special 
hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation.”201  The 
reliance interest here was likely significant as police officers and prosecutors had to change their 
investigative and trial techniques after the new interpretation was announced.   Furthermore, 
while the Court arguably discussed “whether related principles of law have so far developed as 
to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine…or whether facts have so 
changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant 
application or justification,” 202  as mentioned before, it misconstrued the legal landscape 
surrounding the Confrontation Clause.203 
VII.  EFFECTS OF THE NEW CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
 The new interpretation of the Confrontation Clause has created questions and problems.  
Since the Court has developed a new analytical framework and rule for courts to apply, there are 
many unanswered questions about its application.204  Some of these questions will be addressed 
by the Court in future decisions.205  Thus, this paper will focus more on the potential costs of the 
interpretation.  
 The new interpretation may stymie the prosecution of “cold cases.”  If a case is not 
prosecuted quickly, the analyst who prepares a report may die or move.  The new interpretation 
would thus serve as an informal statute of limitations on criminal cases. 206   The new 
interpretation might affect more than just cases that involve laboratory reports.  For example, one 
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key piece of evidence used in the prosecution of old murder cases is the autopsy report.  In 
Crawford, the Court held that evidence is testimonial if it was “made under circumstances which 
would have led an objective witness to reasonably believe that they were made for use in a 
criminal trial.”207  Whether a certain autopsy report is testimonial may depend on the facts of a 
given case, such as whether the jurisdiction requires autopsies in all situations or merely in 
suspicious ones.  Regardless, since coroners are usually state employees and since autopsies 
reports are often generated for use at a criminal,  autopsy reports will probably be considered 
“testimonial” and thus inadmissible.  Assuming the coroner who prepared an autopsy report must 
testify at trial, the prosecution would need to bring the case and elicit the testimony of the 
coroner before the coroner dies or becomes otherwise unavailable.      
Second, the new interpretation will allow those charged with crimes to demand better 
plea agreements because of the added financial cost of trial to prosecutors.  Many crime 
laboratories are already significantly understaffed without having to report to court several times 
a week.208  To reduce these costs, prosecutors may be more willing to offer better plea deals.  
Prosecutors may also be concerned about the inability of the witness to appear at trial.  This is a 
real concern as many jurisdictions share crime laboratories.209  Scheduling conflicts may prevent 
analysts from being at all the trials in which they are scheduled to testify.  Scheduling conflicts 
could lead to delays if trial judges choose to reschedule or wait for the analysts to appear at trial.  
Increased delays could detract from defendants’ right to a speedy trial and ultimately lead to 
dismissals based on violations of that right. 210  If trial judges do not want to wait or reschedule, 
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they could dismiss cases altogether.  Thus, the new interpretation may allow defendants to go 
unprosecuted on mere technicalities.211   
There are several potential solutions to these problems.  States may eliminate criminal 
procedure protections by making some criminal offenses civil offenses.  For example, States may 
decriminalize certain drug offenses.  Similar to ticketing, States could punish the possession of 
certain drugs with monetary fines.212  Several States have already decriminalized the possession 
of marijuana to some extent.213  The Department of Justice reports that in 2009 there were 
1,663,582 arrests for drug violations.214  Making certain drug crimes civil offenses could thus 
dramatically reduce the number of criminal cases.  Decriminalizing some drug offenses would 
also free up jail cells, thus reducing costs for States in that way as well.    
States could also amend their statutes to allow greater flexibility in who may testify and 
how they may testify.  For example, States could allow officers to testify as to the results of field 
tests.215  Since the officer who makes an arrest will likely be testifying at trial anyway, this 
would save States from having to bring the laboratory analysts in to court for every trial.  States 
could also broaden the scope of people allowed to testify to the contents of a laboratory report.  
An analyst’s supervisor or peer may now testify to a report’s contents, although the Supreme 
Court has granted certiorari on a case that will address this issue.216  Another alternative for 
States is to allow analysts to testify via a live video feed.  Maryland v. Craig has not been 
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overruled by the Supreme Court and is thus technically still good law.217  Accordingly, States 
could adopt provisions and court rules allowing these analysts to testify through live streaming 
technology.   
Finally, if the new interpretation proves too burdensome, the Sixth Amendment could be 
amended.  This would obviously be a difficult, but not impossible solution.  Four Supreme Court 
decisions have been overturned through Constitutional Amendment.218 
CONCLUSION 
 The right to confront one’s accusers has a long history in Western society.  Unfortunately, 
its beginnings in American jurisprudence are somewhat unclear; thus, determining what the 
Framers intended the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause to mean is uncertain.  Since 
original intent is difficult to ascertain, the Court should look to history and precedent.  Early 
interpretations of the right to confront suggest that the right was never meant to be absolute.  
Indeed, American courts have recognized automatic exceptions as well as utilized a balancing 
test to determine whether the right should yield to other interests.  Unfortunately, the Court was 
unable to articulate the functionality of these exceptions in the late 20th Century.  In response, the 
Court adopted a strict literal approach to the Confrontation Clause.  This new approach comes at 
a great cost.  As the Court continues to define and refine this new interpretation, States will 
adjust.  If the new rule proves too unworkable, the Court will hopefully have the courage to 
return to its early interpretations and attempt to fashion a rule that is consistent with the earliest 
cases that interpreted this right.    
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